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Philosophy has long been conducted with the logic innate to everyday language as a basis. As for the responsible for the 
conception of several core concepts of philosophy, Aristotle initiated this historical trend. However, numerous 
phenomena do not fall within the realm or logic of everyday language. In those instances, philosophy must diverge from 
this established model. Here, we sought a model case of self-organization in a broad sense and considered a type of 
philosophy directed at examining the workings of experiences with that as a foundation. This seemed to be the best 
option at present for reining in the phenomena of our world today. Within this framework, the topic transitions to the 
emergence of a new actuality. Not only does this introduce original partial elements, but the work becomes the practical 
excercises of recomposing the relationship between the parts and the whole in each case. For the time being, the history 
of the philosophy, information, and environmental systems comprise primary themes of the world philosophy. 
 
 
Prosocial Behavior and Educational Robots 
 
Akiko ARAI, Kazuya MATSUURA 
 
Recently, some scholars in robotics have tried to introduce social robots to educational sites. These robots, however, if 
it were to actualize in most society, might cause ethical and educational problems. This article aims to clarify the part of 
these problems, especially in the case of care-receiving robots, by evaluating them from the psychological perspective 
of the development of prosocial behavior in children. Consequently, we will find that there lies a serious gap on “teaching” 
and “learning” between educators and scholars in robotics. 
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Practice of Suicide Prevention 




Contemplating the role of philosophy in suicide prevention, which requires a comprehensive approach, I propose the 
practice of suicide prevention based on Camus’s philosophy of the Absurd. Traditionally, philosophical debates on 
suicide have focused on its permissibility with little practical utility for its prevention. However, if philosophy is able to 
address suicidal people’s ambivalent psychology of “wanting to live” and “wanting to die,” it can overcome the 
communication problems that suicidal people encounter when discussing the suffering of life with experts or those 
around them. Furthermore, the philosophical effort to acknowledge suffering as a primordial absurdity and assign a 
unique meaning to it, instead of alleviating it, and the related environmental improvement open up new possibilities, 
different from the conventional practice of suicide prevention. 
 
The Concept of Responsibility  




Philosophers in Indian tradition did not address the same topics as Western philosophers have addressed in their tradition. 
This is the case with the concept of responsibility. This does not mean, however, that Indian philosophers did not consider 
such topics or have such conceptions. Rather, we should say that they have viewed these topics and conceptions from 
different perspectives. 
In Indian tradition, thinkers accept the law of karma, which is perhaps regarded as a version of fatalism, and they 
suppose at the same time that they can change the way that the law of karma will affect the future. This compatiblistic 
viewpoint assumes that we are responsible for our actions because we have a decision to make regarding whether to 
perform an action or avoid it. This notion is a close synonym for “the principle of alternate possibilities.” Once we admit 
the possibility that our decision is the intermediary by which we are able to act otherwise, we must also accept that we 
are responsible for what we have decided to do and what we have actually done. We have no freedom in the sense of 
doing things at will. However, we at least have our own decisions to do or avoid something. Therefore, we are partly 
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The Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā (ASVy) is basically a combination of Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya and its 
commentary (Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya). Tibetan translations of the three works were completed by the great 
translator Ye shes sde, but ASVy alone was revised several hundred years later by Nyi ma rgyal mtshan dpal bzang po. 
It is usually impossible to determine the differences between the original and the revised versions, because the originals 
(before revision) are usually not available. However, by applying a certain procedure to ASVy, we were able to clarify 
his revisions at the time. In this paper, I will clarify the characteristics and degree of the revisions made to ASVy, and 
explain exactly how the revision of the translated Tibetan literature was conducted. 
 




Die Habitualität in unserer Lebenswelt wird in der intersubjektiven Umwelt gebildet. Die Selbstverständlichkeit dieser 
Genesis der Habitualität muss aber transzendental phänomenologisch begründet werden. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich 
den Begriff der Habitualität in der Phänomenologie Husserls unter dem Aspekt der Erweckung der Instinktintentionalität 
und der Entwicklung des Ich-Bewusstseins im Zusammenhang mit der Analyse des inneren Zeitbewusstseins 
aufzufassen. Durch solche genetischen Analysen wird es möglich zu zeigen, wie tief die Habitualität in uns, sogar in 
unserem Unbewusstsein wurzelt. 
In §1 dieses Aufsatzes wird zunächst dargestellt, dass die Habitualität Husserls die zwei Entwicklungsstufen der 
Passivität und der Aktivität aufweist. In §2 wird die Habitualität unter dem Begriff der „Assoziation“ der passiven 
Synthesis, von den zwei Aspekten der reproduktiven Assoziation der Wiedererinnerung und der „Urassoziation“ der 
lebendigen Gegenwart her analysiert. In §3 betrachte ich den Unterschied zwischen dem Begriff des Gedächtnisses und 
dem der Habitualität. Schließlich wird in §4 die genetische Entwicklung von der passiven zu der aktiven Habitualität 
unter dem Aspekt des Unterschieds zwischen der instinktiv passiven Kinästhese in der Urassoziation und der aktiven 
Kinästhese durch die Wiedererinnerung der Ichaktivität thematisiert. 
Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, zunächst die dreistufige Einordnung des Begriffs der Habitualität Husserls 
genetisch phänomenologisch, d.h. nach der Gesetzmäßigkeit von Zeitbewusstsein, Assoziation und Urstiftung, 
darzustellen und zweitens das Fundierungsverhältnis zwischen der passiven Habitualität und der aktiven Habitualität zu 
erhellen. 
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Goethe and Robert Boyle (1627-1691) 




The way in which Goethe relates to Robert Boyle is one of the most crucial topics in Goethe research, because Goethe 
mentions Boyle besides Theophrastus as the most important scientist in the history of the colour theory. In fact, Goethe’s 
science has been influenced by Boyle in many aspects: in the recording of all succeeded and failed experiments, in the 
application of the hypothesis as a heuristic method and in the unsystematic theory with the variable principle. Boyle 
exerts strong influence on Goethe in fields ranging from the scientific method to the fundamental view of scientific 
activity itself. However, at present there is no treatise that focuses exclusively on the significance of Boyle in Goethe’s 
natural science. Instead the comparison of Goethe with Newton is repeatedly taken up as a topic, as Goethe severely 
criticized Newton’s optics. The leitmotiv of this comparison recurrently explains that Goethe rejects the concept of 
modern science. Nevertheless, Boyle is the representative virtuoso of modern science, who had initiated experimental 
science. If Goethe, as the usual interpretation indicates, is simply standing in confrontation to modern science, it cannot 
be consistently explained why Goethe approved Boyle. 
This theme reveals the primal content of Goethe’s natural science and at the same time it provides a new perspective 
on the disjunction between Goethe and Newton in the history of science. The crux of Goethe’s critique of Newton lies 
in the conception of the experiment. Goethe denies Newton’s exclusive verification of theory with the experimentum 
crucis. Yet it had been Boyle who had established this concept of the experimentum crucis. He exerts strong influence 
on Newton and Goethe not only through his concept of the experiment, but also through his usage of the hypothesis and 
the principles of science. To understand the essence of Goethe’s natural science and the differentiation between Goethe 
and Newton, the triad of Goethe, Newton and Boyle must indispensably be taken into consideration.  
Therefore, it must be investigated which scientific program underlies Boyle’s experimental science, and how Goethe 
and Newton differ from each other based on this approach. Herein lies a fundamental theme of science and philosophy: 
the relation between theoria and poiesis. The demonstration of theory through experiment entails a connecting point 
between abstract theory and artistic or technical creation (poiesis), because the experimental science is the very activity 
that intermediates between the mere speculative idea and the concrete phenomenon produced by human action. The 
investigation of the triad of Goethe, Newton and Boyle thus discloses an early moment within the history of science 
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The Manner of Being of What Exists in the Human Mind: 
Descartes and Nominalism 
Takeshi OHNO 
 
According to Descartes, a cause is essential for an idea to be formed, but Caterus considered an idea to be an intellection 
(intellectio) or a conceptual being (ens rationis) and refuted that a cause is not necessary for the formation of an idea. 
So far this conflict has mostly been understood as “Thomism” (Caterus) versus “Scotism” (Descartes), but Caterus’ 
theory of idea is Ockhamistic. Both Ockham and Caterus considered an idea to be a conceptual being and at the same 
time a real being (ens reale). According to Descartes, however, an idea is not a conceptual being but a real one. Thus, 
both Caterus and Descartes have a point in common that what exists in the mind is a real being. However, their bases for 
the reality of an idea are different. For Ockham, a concept depends on the mind that is its subject or on the representative 
object, but for Descartes it depends on the representative content of idea itself or on the manner of being of idea. Terefore, 
it is evident that for Descartes the idea is a real being in itself. 
 




In my article last year, I examined the pluralism in William James’s theory of truth—that knowledge gained from 
observation can always be explained from multiple worldviews and that the worldview for which one stands depends on 
one’s “temperament.” In other words, “nature” is pluralistic. However, this pluralistic theory of truth can be seen as mere 
“voluntarism” when the interpretation is made that logical investigation has not been completed before the advent of 
“temperament.”  
With respect to the impossibility of completion of this investigation, Quine’s Indeterminacy of Translation thesis 
demonstrates that regarding the meaning of a word in an unknown language, no matter how much one observes a native 
person’s actions associated with it, there is still room for judgment based on the linguist’s intuition. This leads to an 
under-determinacy of theory. Further, Wittgenstein’s language-game theory shows that any rule can be applied for a 
given statement, that there is no basis for applying a given rule, and that herein lays the functional significance of the 
Weltbild or world-picture. 
The under-determinacy of theory and the varied possibilities of applying rules indicate that James’s pluralistic theory 
of truth is still valid even after exhausting logical investigations. This means that even after exhausting scientific 
exploration, “nature” is still not confined to monism but evolves pluralistically. 
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Empirical Pragmatism and its Potential: 
Toward Deepening “Inquiry” 
Tasuku FUJISAKA 
 
This paper is an attempt to present the potential of the thought of pragmatism rooted in the development of practical 
experience. The thought of pragmatism, since its proponent Peirce, has led to the formation of original theories such as 
the fallibilistic theory of truth and even plastic realism (especially William James), using "inquiry" as a model case of 
experience. This led Richard Rorty to develop his own pragmatism, rooted in "anti-foundationalism," "anti-
essentialism," and "anti-representationalism. However, since the objectivity that Peirce had once emphasized in his 
theories of inquiry was neglected in these theories, Rorty were thoroughly criticized by modern theorists (New 
Pragmatists) such as Cheryl Misak. However, defending pragmatism's theory of truth as an attempt to build a system of 
knowledge based on universality may overlook the potential that pragmatism originally possessed. Therefore, in this 
paper, I will go back to Rorty and refer to his successor, Hilary Putnam's theory of reality, with the aim of illuminating 
the potential of pragmatism based on experience. In the end, it will be found that empirical pragmatism has the potential 
to be a theory of deepening inquiry that is in line with Deleuze's transcendental empiricism. 
